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RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, THE COMMON GOOD,
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW IN RECENT DECADES:
HAS THE LEGAL PROFESSION FAILED IN




In a scene in the play and movie, A Man for All Seasons,
Thomas More has a memorable exchange with the members of
his family, who strongly admonish him for allowing the
ambitious scoundrel Richard Rich to freely leave his premises
instead of placing him under arrest (More was then Lord
Chancellor of England, effectively the highest law enforcement
official). More, emphasizing that Rich had broken no law, has his
sharpest words for his impetuous son-in-law Will Roper who
cannot understand how More would spare even the Devil from
arrest in those circumstances and says, to the contrary, that he
would destroy all the laws to get at him. More responds by
asking him where he would hide in that then-lawless condition
when the Devil turned on him. How would he "stand upright in
the winds that would blow then?"' More says that it is for his
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"own safety's sake"2 that he would "give the Devil benefit of
law."
3
This short dialogue instructs us about a few vital points
concerning law: law is a protector and source of order; for the
sake of the innocent, laws must protect even the guilty and the
evildoer; man needs law for an even tolerable level of existence;
and law cannot be used arbitrarily to achieve even the best of
ends because that arbitrariness will eventually turn on us. More
defends the law of his native England even as he is aware that it
may be turned on him; indeed, he winds up a victim of the very
arbitrariness and result-oriented notion of law that he rebukes
Roper for embracing.
Today, we frequently emphasize our commitment to the rule
of law as More did, but we have seen disturbing developments in
American law in the last few decades, which have eroded
traditional legal protections, been increasingly result-oriented
(e.g., checking crime regardless of the costs), grown increasingly
arbitrary and impervious to guilt or innocence, imposed legal
obligations whose mandates are unclear to citizens, and arguably
failed to promote the common good. These developments have
been ably chronicled by a number of books that have appeared
over the last decade and a half, a number of which are discussed
in this Article.
These developments have occurred right under the nose of
the legal profession, despite its role as the major guardian of the
rule of law in American life and its ethical obligation to seek to
improve the law. In fact, segments of the profession have
encouraged, overseen, and worked to further them.
I. ETHICAL OBLIGATION
Canon 8 of the American Bar Association's Model Code of
Professional Responsibility-a Code that has been adopted in
whole or part by most states--says that "A Lawyer Should Assist
in Improving the Legal System."4  The various canons have
ensuing "Ethical Considerations." The pertinent Ethical
Considerations for Canon 8 are the following:
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 8 (1980).
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EC 8-1: Changes in human affairs and imperfections in human
institutions make necessary constant efforts to maintain and
improve our legal system. This system should function in a
manner that commands public respect and fosters the use of
legal remedies to achieve redress of grievances. By reason of
education and experience, lawyers are especially qualified to
recognize deficiencies in the legal system and to initiate
corrective measures therein. Thus they should participate in
proposing and supporting legislation and programs to improve
the system, without regard to the general interests or desires of
clients or former clients.
EC 8-2: Rules of law are deficient if they are not just,
understandable, and responsive to the needs of society. If a
lawyer believes that the existence or absence of a rule of law,
substantive or procedural, causes or contributes to an unjust
result, he should endeavor by lawful means to obtain
appropriate changes in the law. He should encourage the
simplification of laws and the repeal or amendment of laws that
are outmoded. Likewise, legal procedures should be improved
whenever experience indicates a change is needed ....
EC 8-5: Fraudulent, deceptive, or otherwise illegal conduct by a
participant in a proceeding before a tribunal or legislative body
is inconsistent with fair administration of justice, and it should
never be participated in or condoned by lawyers ....
EC 8-7: Since lawyers are a vital part of the legal system, they
should be persons of integrity, of professional skill, and of
dedication to the improvement of the system. Thus a lawyer
should aid in establishing, as well as enforcing, standards of
conduct adequate to protect the public by insuring that those
who practice law are qualified to do so ....
EC 8-9: The advancement of our legal system is of vital
importance in maintaining the rule of law and in facilitating
orderly changes; therefore, lawyers should encourage, and
should aid in making, needed changes and improvements. 5
Some state codes of professional responsibility elaborate
even further and more specifically on this ethical requirement.
For example, Pennsylvania's code states the following:
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the
law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice and
the quality of service rendered by the legal profession. As a
5 Id. EC 8-1, 8-2, 8-5, 8-7, 8-9.
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member of a learned profession, a lawyer should cultivate
knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that
knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal
education. In addition, a lawyer should further the public's
understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the
justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional
democracy depend on popular participation and support to
maintain their authority. 6
II. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IMPERILING RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND
THE COMMON GOOD
What developments in American law have compromised
rights, liberties, and the common good? The following is by no
means an exhaustive list:
" The use of the criminal law to address what had
previously been understood to be civil matters-
especially in tort-or simply matters of ethics or even
manners.
" The explosion of vague and technicality-laden
government regulations, so that no one-including the
enforcers-is really sure of what is legal or illegal.
" The erosion of the requirement of mens rea to
successfully secure a criminal prosecution.
" The expansion of the reach and scope of such
traditionally all-purpose crimes as conspiracy and mail
fraud.
" The increased enactment and application of asset
forfeiture statutes, so that people can, and have, lost
their property if it was in some way used in a crime,
even if they did not commit it. 7
" The growth of the retroactive application of the law-
contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the
constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws-
especially in the environmental area.
6 204 PA. CODE § 81.1(6) (2008).
7 Sometimes a criminal defendant's assets are even seized before trial to deny
the assets necessary to retain legal counsel of choice.
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" The utter explosion of plea bargaining, which has
sharply reduced the number of criminal trials, so that
they have become the clear exception instead of the rule,
with a serious compromising of the right to trial.
" The growth of prosecutions, especially in the white collar
area, based on speculation and theorizing instead of
evidence, and the routine use of heavy prosecutorial
pressure on the accused to get them to plead guilty even
if they did not commit a crime.
" The use of loose plea deals with a person to get him to
implicate someone else, even if the deals constitute
statutory bribery.
" The weakening of attorney-client privilege by
prosecutorial pressures, especially in prominent white
collar crime cases-including suits against law firms,
freezing of firm assets, and even indictments.
" The growth of the practice by prosecutors of using
uncorroborated information from prison inmates, often
arranged in advance by the prosecutors to more readily
secure indictments.
" The growing tendency to turn crime victims into
criminals, as with laws that punish people for leaving
their keys in their car when a thief steals it or that
punish them for using a weapon to defend themselves
against an intruder.
" The multiplying of laws that punish action or inaction
on the basis of a speculative harm.
" The increasing use of the eminent domain power, not for
traditional public purposes, but simply to transfer land
to developers or private corporations in the anticipation
of enhanced tax revenues, given U.S. Supreme Court
imprimatur in Kelo v. City of New London.8
" In the drive to ensure uniformity and supposed fairness,
regulatory law has become so rigid that it cannot come
to grips with obvious needs, problems, and necessary
8 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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differences, and brings about results that defy common
sense.
In order to secure compliance with law and desirable
public policy objectives-such as stopping child abuse
and ensuring environmental quality-we are
increasingly expecting average citizens to become snoops
and snitches, so that people in our supposedly free
country are increasingly being watched over by
unnamed persons who often report them to authorities
for behaviors that by any commonsensical standard are
completely innocent.
" Due to the wide use of sting operations, people are
routinely being set up for criminal activity that by any
serious standard-even though courts give broad leeway
to law enforcement authorities-would constitute
entrapment.
" By proclaiming all sorts of things as rights and making
civil rights claims easy to make, we have created a
situation where both private and public authorities are
reluctant to make decisions about employees and others,
and manipulative individuals can more readily achieve
self-serving ends.9
We now examine and give examples of a number of these
different developments and observe, where possible, how they
offend the apparent meaning or spirit of the different Ethical
Considerations of Canon 8--or in some cases other canons of the
ABA Code.
III. VAGUE LAWS
In an article in the anthology Go Directly to Jail: The
Criminalization of Almost Everything, James V. DeLong of the
Progress and Freedom Foundation writes about the increased
use of criminal penalties-all part and parcel of the post-Enron
era-against corporate officers for the failure to give a
sufficiently accurate account to their companies of their
9 As a result, different groups-with a heightened sense of group identity-have
become suspicious and in conflict with each other causing the common good to be
ignored.
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activities. This is happening despite the fact that there are no
established standards. As one federal judge put it, the jury in a
particular case "invents" the crime. The "law" is applied even if
the company suffered no loss or harm. 10
Environmental laws and regulations are another area where
civil and criminal penalties are imposed routinely for "offenses"
that people are not aware they have committed. Writing in the
above volume, Timothy Lynch of the CATO Institute argues that
the U.S. Supreme Court has mostly allowed Congress and state
legislatures to pass vague environmental legislation. A 1993
survey reported that forty-seven percent of corporate attorneys
interviewed said that on environmental matters they spent most
of their time trying to determine whether or not their companies
were complying with the law. About seventy percent of them
said that they did not believe that the environmental laws could
be completely complied with, due in part to their complexity and
the varying interpretations given to them by regulatory agencies
and personnel.1  In addition, enforcement of the vague
environmental laws does not target just big corporations.
Increasingly, individuals-even if they proceed in accordance
with legal advice given to them by government agencies-are
being prosecuted, sometimes for things as simple as a leaky
septic tank.12
It is even more disturbing that such constitutional
guarantees as the right against self-incrimination and searches
without a warrant are being whittled down by court decisions in
environmental cases. Reports made pursuant to compliance
requirements, for example, can be the basis for a criminal
prosecution of the reporter. In other words, if you fail to report,
it is a crime, and if you do report, the information that you have
given-about yourself-can be used to find you guilty of an
environmental crime. 13
The federal tax laws are another obvious example of
vagueness. The result of innumerable compromises and
accommodations among different interests and political positions
10 James V. DeLong, The New "Criminal" Classes: Legal Sanctions and Business
Managers, in Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING
9, 13 (Gene Healy ed., 2004) [hereinafter Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL].
11 Timothy Lynch, Polluting Our Principles: Environmental Prosecutions and
the Bill of Rights, in Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL, supra note 10, at 45, 49-50.
12 See DeLong, supra note 10, at 12.
13 Lynch, supra note 11, at 62-63.
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over nearly a century, they contain many provisions that are not
only unclear but also essentially contradictory. People frequently
have the experience that when they ask the same question about
a certain tax provision to different IRS operatives even in the
same office, they get different answers. A congressional
investigation revealed that in 1999, the IRS gave 9.8 million
incorrect answers to phoned-in taxpayer questions; in 2001, it
was 17 million. 14 Even tax experts outside the agency have
trouble determining the correct answer to certain tax questions. 15
An example of the problem is the way that the IRS classifies
workers as opposed to independent contractors. The IRS has
sought to minimize the latter classification as much as possible.
In 1990, an official IRS advisory group concluded, "'the process
of classifying workers is confusing, complex, antiquated, and
unfair.' "16
Another area of vague laws-an area that involves the most
intimate of human associations, the family-involves child abuse,
neglect, endangerment, etc. Since passage in 1974 of the federal
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ("CAPTA"), as we
discuss below, American parents in large numbers have faced
investigations and allegations of abuse and neglect-and in some
cases loss of their children temporarily or permanently-for
actions that under no reasonable standard could be put into
these categories. As Jeanne M. Giovannoni and Rosina M.
Becerra's book Defining Child Abuse puts it, "Many assume that
since child abuse and neglect are against the law, somewhere
there are statutes that make clear distinctions between what is
and what is not child abuse and neglect. But this is not the case.
Nowhere are there clear-cut definitions of what is encompassed
by the terms."17  Douglas J. Besharov, one of the leading
professional/scholarly authorities on the child protective system,
writes that, "Existing standards set no limits on [family]
14 See CATHERINE CRIER, THE CASE AGAINST LAWYERS: How LAWYERS,
POLITICIANS, AND BUREAUCRATS HAVE TURNED THE LAW INTO AN INSTRUMENT OF
TYRANNY-AND WHAT WE AS CITIZENS HAVE TO Do ABOUT IT 84 (2002).
15 See JAMES BOVARD, LOST RIGHTS: THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERTY
275 (1994). Crier also notes how in one year, H&R Block gave the same tax packet to
forty-four experts who worked out forty-four different returns. See CRIER, supra note
14, at 84.
16 BOVARD, supra note 15, at 260.
17 JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI & ROSINA M. BECERRA, DEFINING CHILD ABUSE 2
(Free Press 1979).
[Vol. 47:9
2008] RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, & THE COMMON GOOD 17
intervention and provide no guidelines for decision-making."' 8
As with environmental regulations and tax law, even the people
charged with enforcement do not know what the law requires, as
has been shown by different studies of the attitudes of social
workers in child protective agencies. 19 It is not surprising that
influential, long-time academic child abuse "expert" Murray A.
Straus claims that even yelling or screaming at one's child should
be considered abuse as a form of "verbal" or "psychological
aggression."20  Even though overbreadth and vagueness have
been grounds for the courts to strike down laws as
unconstitutional, when it comes to child abuse, they have been
notoriously reluctant to do so. 2'
Consider, as a further sampling, two other regulatory
agencies of the federal government. Catherine Crier, a lawyer,
media legal correspondent, and former prosecutor and judge,
brings to our attention how two-thirds of Department of
Agriculture inspectors failed a test that was administered to
determine their knowledge of the regulations that they were
supposed to enforce to prevent the possibility of food
contamination. 22 She also writes, "Business owners complain
that one [OSHA ("Occupational Safety and Health
18 Douglas J. Besharov, "Doing Something" About Child Abuse: The Need to
Narrow the Grounds for State Intervention, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 539, 570
(1985) [hereinafter Besharov, Doing Something]; see also Douglas J. Besharov, Child
Abuse Realities: Over-Reporting and Poverty, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 165, 190 (2000)
[hereinafter Besharov, Child Abuse Realities] ("Many [unfounded reports] involve
situations in which a well-intentioned person who reports (in an effort to protect a
child) is overreacting to a vague and often misleading possibility that the child may
be maltreated.").
19 See, e.g., MARY PRIDE, THE CHILD ABUSE INDUSTRY 14-22 (1986); Besharov,
Doing Something, supra note 18, at 569-70.
20 See Lisa Marshall, Yelling at Kids Harms Them Long Term, CINCINNATI
POST, Mar. 2, 2004, at B3; Christopher Healy, Because I Said So!!, SALON.COM, Dec.
11, 2003, http://archive.salon.com/mwt/feature/2003/12/11/study/index.html (stating
that in the results of the study Straus and a colleague released in 2003, they
admitted reluctance to label yelling and screaming or psychological aggression as
abuse, but did so in their press release on the study and in the interview Healy did
with him for the article). An earlier article co-authored by Straus indicates that
among child abuse experts and related professionals, the notion of "verbal abuse" is
widely accepted. See Yvonne M. Vissing, Murray A. Straus, Richard J. Gelles & John
W. Harrop, Verbal Aggression by Parents and Psychosocial Problems of Children, 15
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 223, 223 (1991).
21 See, e.g., State v. Grover, 437 N.W.2d 60, 61 (Minn. 1989).
22 CRIER, supra note 14, at 77.
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Administration")] inspector might tour a company finding no
violations while another might write up a dozen.."23
When lawyer-legislators, prosecutors, and judges-for that
matter the entire legal profession-promote, enact, apply, or
tolerate such vague laws and regulations with the force of law,
they are arguably failing in their ethical obligations under
Ethical Consideration 8-2-again, which states "Rules of laws are
deficient if they are not.., understandable .... -"24 If, indeed, the
IRS has some regulations that are, as their advisory group said,
"antiquated and unfair," then the lawyers involved run afoul of
two other parts of 8-2: "If a lawyer believes that the existence or
absence of a rule of law ... causes or contributes to an unjust
result, he should endeavor.., to obtain.., changes in the law,"25
and "should encourage ... the repeal or amendment of laws that
are outmoded."26
IV. OTHER PROBLEMS WITH REGULATORY LAW
Related to the above problems are the next three legal
developments: (1) the huge number of regulatory rules; (2) the
frequent conflict among laws and regulatory rules; and (3) the
unworkability of many regulatory rules. Crier points out that in
1936, in the early years of the administrative state spawned by
the New Deal, there were 2,411 pages of regulations in the
Federal Register. That might seem imposing enough, but today
there are about 75,000 pages.27 Political reasons explain much of
this explosion of regulatory rules. Congress makes many of the
statutes they pass deliberately vague to cut down on strong -or
direct political opposition. They also want to satisfy interest
groups. The lame-duck president's desire to "go out in a blaze of
glory," to try to enshrine into law his political perspective, and to
address what he perceives as lingering problems all have helped
increase the number of regulations. In fact, the last fourteen
presidents have increased regulations by about seventeen
percent in the last part of their administrations. 28 Crier also
23 Id. at 80.
24 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-2 (1980).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 CRIER, supra note 14, at 63.
28 See id. at 64.
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says that simple bureaucratic audacity and aggressiveness is
another reason.29
This multiplication of the number and complexity of
regulatory laws-which lawyers routinely have a large role in-
also seems to go against Ethical Consideration 8-2, which, to
repeat, states that lawyers "should encourage the simplification
of laws."
3°
Crier gives a striking set of examples that illustrate the
conflict among federal regulatory rules:
Pretend for a moment.., that you know all the rules. Then
you're faced with the question of which ones to obey.
Throughout the regulatory world, there are major conflicts to
sort out. The trucking company that rejects a driver with sight
in only one eye is complying with the standard required by the
U.S. Department of Transportation, but the EEOC may sue it
for discrimination. Watch out if you screen for alcoholism, drug
abuse, even criminal records. You may come under fire
regardless of the safety considerations that should be
paramount. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) often butt heads,
requiring different standards for the same products.
Environmentally conscious businesses can get really confused.
Follow the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act to properly
dispose of waste and you may violate the Toxic Control
Substance Act. The list goes on and on.3 1
If all laws and regulations were enforced with exactitude-
especially when one factors in the lack of clarity about what they
mean and how they conflict with each other-it would be
impossible to meet their requirements. The law would simply be
unworkable. Instead of regulating something to protect and aid
the public, it would eliminate a needed activity altogether. Crier
points to one OSHA report that admits, "If all meat-inspecting
regulations were enforced to the letter, no meat-processor in
America would be open for business. ' 32  As it is, OSHA's
effectiveness in accomplishing its purpose is questionable. As
she puts it, "Despite thirty years of (over)diligent rule making,
[OSHA] itself estimates that 80 percent of American workplaces
29 See id. at 63-64.
30 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-2 (1980).
31 CRIER, supra note 14, at 63.
32 Id. at 76.
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are not in compliance with the law."3 3 Indeed, one of OSHA's
further problems, which is all too typical of American regulatory
law and the perspective of regulatory agencies today, is that
OSHA has sought to regulate virtually everything in its subject
matter area, instead of "clearly identifiable problem[s]." 34 This
pattern also exists in the child protective system. CAPTA and its
progeny-and the attitudes of those manning the child protective
agencies-have as their aim, eliminating the very possibility of
any child abuse or neglect occurring. They, like OSHA, seek not
only to address real harms, but speculative or prospective ones as
well. Besharov writes how this has proven to be unrealistic and,
in fact, has had the effect of agencies getting so caught up in
pursuing harmless parental behaviors that genuine cases of
abuse are often overlooked or inadequately addressed.3 5
In a lecture she gave to the Federalist Society in 2003, Judge
Edith Jones of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit-sometimes mentioned as a possible Supreme Court
nominee-alleged that the rule of law is threatened because
governmental "agencies... have made the law so complicated
that it is difficult to decipher and often contradicts itself."36
Ethical Consideration 8-9 above, and for that matter, the entire
ABA Code, underscores the essential role of lawyers to work to
uphold the rule of law.
V. THE ABSOLUTIZATION OF RIGHTS AND FAILURE TO
ACCOMMODATE DIFFERENT GROUPS IN SOCIETY: THE CASE OF
DISABILITY RIGHTS
Critics such as Crier and Philip K. Howard-the author of
the noted books The Death of Common Sense37 and The Collapse
of the Common Good38-have written about the glaring failure of
33 Id. at 80.
34 Id.
35 See Besharov, Child Abuse Realities, supra note 18, at 191-92; Besharov,
Doing Something, supra note 18, at 574-75.
36 Geraldine Hawkins, American Legal System Is Corrupt Beyond Recognition,
Judge Tells Harvard Law School, MASS. NEWS, Mar. 7, 2003, http:!
www.massnews.com/2003-Editions/3_March/030703_mnamericanlegal-system_
corrupt.shtml (quoting Judge Edith Jones).
37 PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW Is
SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994) [hereinafter HOWARD, DEATH OF COMMON SENSE].
38 PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD: How AMERICA'S
LAWSUIT CULTURE UNDERMINES OUR FREEDOM (Ballantine Books 2002) (2001)
[hereinafter HOWARD, COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD].
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American law in recent years to accommodate the competing
needs and rights of different groups of people in society, which is
a traditional role of both law and politics. While several areas
could be subject to critique, one major area of failure which they
point to is disabilities rights. The thrust of statutes such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") has been to establish
absolute rights, even if by their nature the matters in question
cannot be treated in an absolutist fashion and, instead, cry out
for compromise and accommodation. Even though the ADA
requires only that "reasonable accommodations" be made for the
disabled, 39 what the following examples indicate is that this
standard is not necessarily followed. We witness, for example,
the New York City transit authority having to reduce by ten
percent the number of buses it could purchase because under the
ADA it had to purchase only buses with wheelchair lifts-which
are much more expensive. The extra cost and fewer buses led to
an overall service cutback. As Howard puts it, this meant "a
grandmother in the Bronx had to wait an extra half hour in the
cold in a dangerous neighborhood. Who... was defending her
rights?"40  It is not even that cities like New York are not
providing special transit for handicapped persons, but advocacy
groups insist that they be "mainstreamed." So, one New York
commuter complains that she no longer can take the bus she had
taken to work every day because the wheelchair-bound man who
routinely rides it needs twenty extra minutes to get on and off
along the way, which makes her late for work. The transit
authority has 180 fewer seats available on one of their subway
lines because of wheelchair-turning-radius requirements. 41 Crier
writes that by law, builders in Pima, Arizona must make the first
floor of every new home wheelchair accessible and provide at
least one accommodating bathroom-irrespective of whether a
wheelchair-bound person will ever live in or visit them.42
In public education, we see perhaps the most acute examples
of the lack of compromise-and good sense-in disability law.
The New York City Board of Education spends twenty-five
39 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)
(2000) (defining discrimination as including "not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability").
40 HOWARD, DEATH OF COMMON SENSE, supra note 37, at 144.
41 See id. at 144-45.
42 See CRIER, supra note 14, at 32.
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percent of its total budget on special education, even though this
involves only about ten percent of its students.43  The
mainstreaming of handicapped school children is given a strong
emphasis. The problem is that when mainstreamed into regular
classrooms, they face a sixty-one percent failure rate nationwide,
as opposed to only a fourteen percent rate in special education
classrooms. 44 This does not factor in the disruption caused by
some special needs children in the regular classroom setting.
When one reads this, one understands why Howard titled his
book The Death of Common Sense. The extreme nature of some
of the demands on school districts and the taxpayers to meet the
educational needs of handicapped children is seen in such cases
as these: in New Hampshire, a mother successfully pressed a
legal case for her profoundly disabled son who had virtually no
cerebral cortex and who various experts agreed could not benefit
from educational services; in Georgia, the parents of a child with
multiple disabilities were dissatisfied with the district's program
and a court forced the district to pay the costs of sending him to a
special school in Tokyo, Japan; despite the large special
education program in New York City, the dissatisfied
grandmother of a severely retarded girl legally forced the district
to send her to a top-flight special school in Boston; in another
case, one school district was paying $200,000 per year for one
special education student.45
Crier states that since the enactment of the ADA in 1990,
the number of annual lawsuits has tripled, in part because the
statute permits the winner to receive attorney fees. Despite all
the stress on wheelchair accommodation, most suits concern not
mobility, but bad backs and physiological and neurological
problems. 46 Our personal experience indicates that this is the
case in a university setting, too: Most disability accommodations
concern not mobility, but learning disabilities and ADD. Crier
argues that "the 'victimized' [have] become the 'abusers,"'47 and
we can understand why Howard says that such laws have made
us "a nation of enemies." 48
43 See HOWARD, DEATH OF COMMON SENSE, supra note 37, at 147.
44 See id. at 149.
45 See id. at 146-47.
46 See CRIER, supra note 14, at 34.
47 Id.
48 This is the title of section III of The Death of Common Sense. See HOWARD,
DEATH OF COMMON SENSE, supra note 37, at 111.
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It is not unreasonable to say that there are issues of justice
and responsiveness to the needs of society in laws such as the
above. In addition, the vagueness and unclear standards of laws
such as the ADA and the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act raise obvious questions of understandability and
arbitrariness. Ethical Consideration 8-2, which insists that laws
be simple, understandable, and not likely to contribute to an
unjust result,49 and Ethical Consideration 8-9, which emphasizes
the need to uphold the rule of law-whose very nature is
supposed to preclude arbitrariness 5°-seem to be ignored.
VI. DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW AND EXCESSIVE
PROSECUTORIAL POWER
Various authors have written about troubling developments
that have occurred in criminal law in the last few decades. One
is the seemingly excessive use of the criminal law. We have seen
an increasing tendency of legislatures to criminalize matters that
historically have been in the realm of tort, or even of manners.
Sometimes, even without the sanction of legislative enactment or
judicial interpretation, prosecutors have built cases on legal
theories. They might base such theories upon torturous
interpretations of broadly written statutes. Erik Luna, a former
prosecutor and current law professor at the University of Utah,
says that "conduct that was once actionable only by civil suit [is]
now susceptible to criminal prosecution as well, oftentimes at the
sole discretion of the relevant law enforcement agency."51
Sometimes, criminal prosecutions even reach into the realm of
manners. So, we witness such conduct as eating on the
Washington Metro, 52 the wearing of low-cut pants below the
waist when any underwear is shown,5 3 the use of vulgar words, 54
and annoying the birds in public parks, turned into or attempted
49 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-2 (1980).
50 See id. EC 8-9.
51 Erik Luna, Overextending the Criminal Law, in Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL, supra
note 10, at 1, 4.
52 This case, which came before Judge John G. Roberts on appeal, involved a
twelve-year-old girl who was arrested for eating a French fry in a Metro station. See
id. at 1.
53 See Gene Healy, Introduction to Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL, supra note 10, at vii,
viii-ix [hereinafter Healy, Introduction].
54 See John Carpenter, National Briefing Midwest: Michigan: Reversal on
Vulgar-Language Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2002, at A20.
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to be turned into crimes.55 Gene Healy of the Cato Institute
writes in the introduction to the book Go Directly to Jail: The
Criminalization of Almost Everything that this signals a
"systemic [problem], driven by legislators who are all too willing
to turn every social problem into a matter for the criminal law."56
Harvard Law professor William Stuntz contends that we are
moving "ever closer to a world in which the law on the books
makes everyone a felon."57
One significant way in which we have seen the expansion of
the criminal law has been by the inclusion, by Congress, of more
and more matters into the federal criminal code-keeping in
mind that historically in the United States the criminal law has
been a state matter. In 2004, there were more than 4,000 federal
crimes, an increase of one-third since 1980. Since 1997, thirty-
five percent of the growth of federal crimes has been in the
environmental area. They are spread out over 27,000 pages of
the U.S. Code and incorporate the regulatory violations discussed
above-in 1994, 300,000 federal regulations carried criminal
penalties. The result is that it is difficult to ascertain in many
cases precisely what federal law prohibits. 58
Another disturbing development in the criminal law has
been the diminishing of mens rea requirements, i.e., the
traditional requirement that a person have the intention to do
wrong or to violate the law in order to have the grounds to
prosecute. This has been seen in recent years in the
environmental and white-collar crimes areas. In their book, The
Tyranny of Good Intentions, syndicated columnist and economist
Paul Craig Roberts and lawyer Lawrence M. Stratton mention
several important cases where mens rea was essentially
abandoned. One was the case of Benjamin Lacy, a small
business owner in Virginia, who made honest mistakes in filling
out environmental report forms and was prosecuted because the
U.S. Justice Department theorized that the mistakes must have
meant that he was a polluter-even though the stream in
question was free of pollution, which thus meant that there was
55 Luna, supra note 51, at 2.
56 Healy, Introduction, supra note 53, at xi.
57 Id. (quoting William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 511 (2001)).
58 See Healy, Introduction, supra note 53, at xiii; DeLong, supra note 10, at 9.
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not only no mens rea, but also no actus reus.59 Another case was
that of Charles H. Keating, Jr., identified as a prominent figure
in the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s. He was
prosecuted in state court in California even though there was no
evidence that he had at all been involved with or known about
the sale of the "junk" bonds in the case. Prosecutors admitted
that they were inventing a crime by trying to transform the tort
doctrine of respondeat superior into a crime in which Keating
would be criminally responsible for the actions of his salesmen-
employees-and Judge Lance Ito, who later received much
criticism for his handling of the O.J. Simpson case, allowed them
to get away with it. Keating, who was long known for his anti-
pornography and charitable activities, spent over four years in
prison for his "crime," until a federal court overturned his
conviction because of the lack of mens rea and the fact that he
was prosecuted under what, effectively, was an unconstitutional
ex post facto law.60 Yet another case was the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International ("BCCI") case involving Clark Clifford
and Robert A. Altman. These prominent Washington lawyers
were charged with bribery and money laundering to cover up
supposedly secret financial arrangements they had made with
BCCI so as to enrich themselves. The case collapsed quickly once
in court because neither the state, nor federal authorities, had
either an actus reus or mens rea; it was another case built on
prosecutorial theorizing, this time of a quite speculative nature.61
The final case that Roberts and Stratton discuss is the Exxon
Valdez oil spill case of 1990. Even though the spill was due to an
accident and Exxon made a massive, successful clean-up effort,
the U.S. Justice Department criminally prosecuted the company.
As grounds for the prosecution, the government clearly twisted
the meaning of several federal statutes, admitting that its
approach was "innovative." All of the violations required intent
to damage the environment in the ways alleged that clearly was
not there. Despite the highly problematical charges, Exxon-
possibly fearing the damage to the company from the on-going
59 PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE TYRANNY OF GOOD
INTENTIONS: How PROSECUTORS AND BUREAUCRATS ARE TRAMPLING THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE 60-61 (2000). Actus reus refers to the
traditional requirement that there be evidence that a criminal act or omission
actually occurred in order to prosecute someone. See id.
60 See id. at 51-54 & n.4.
61 See id. at 56-59.
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public scrutiny of a trial-accepted a plea offer from the
government and paid a huge fine. 62
Roberts and Stratton write that the way was paved for these
decisions of the 1990s by a few U.S. Supreme Court decisions in
the first sixty years of the twentieth century.63 The Justices
expressed the view that abuses would not result from loosening
mens rea requirements because the American criminal justice
system and the government's agents would be fair. For example,
Justice Felix Frankfurter spoke of "[t]he good sense of
prosecutors, [and] the wise guidance of judges," and U.S.
Attorney General and later Justice Robert Jackson stressed that
prosecutors must pursue justice rather than "statistics of
success."64 If conditions then provided any justification for this
rosy outlook, they certainly have not continued. As Roberts and
Stratton state, "attorney general after attorney general,
Republican and Democrat, has given countless speeches bragging
about success in getting convictions." They conclude that "[t]he
quest for justice and solicitude for fairness toward citizens is a
forgotten topic at the Department of Justice." 65 Come to think of
it, when has one recently heard a local district attorney or a U.S.
attorney publicly state that he is primarily focused on the pursuit
of justice, even if it means he will get fewer convictions?
We can easily see how provisions of Canon 8 come into play
here. Lawyers are not working to make the law understandable
or just if people can be charged with and convicted of crimes that
are spun from the theories of prosecutors and not respecting of
the basic legal principles, deeply ingrained into our law, about
the elements needed to have a prosecutable crime. They are
obviously countenancing a defective set of legal procedures that
would permit such a situation-also in violation of what Ethical
Consideration 8-2 expects of them. Indeed, we can see that they
are not doing enough to even see that the rule of law is being
upheld because administering the criminal law in such a manner
is a baby step above arbitrariness. Further, is such behavior by
prosecutors very far from the "[f]raudulent, deceptive, or
otherwise illegal conduct by a participant in a proceeding before
a tribunal ... [which] is inconsistent with fair administration of
62 See id. at 47-50.
63 See id. at 62-65.
64 Id. at 63.
65 Id.
[Vol. 47:9
2008] RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, & THE COMMON GOOD 27
justice" discussed in Ethical Consideration 8-5?66 Unwarranted
prosecutions bring other parts of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility into focus: Ethical Consideration 7-13 under
Canon 7 insists that a prosecutor's "duty is to seek justice, not
merely to convict"6 7 -upholding the principles enunciated by
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson above. Ethical Consideration
7-13 goes on to stipulate that a prosecutor "should use restraint
in the discretionary exercise of governmental powers, such as in
the selection of cases to prosecute," and that "in our system of
criminal justice the accused is to be given the benefit of all
reasonable doubts."68  It is evident that in cases such as the
above where novel theories are the basis for charges and where
such basic requirements as mens rea and actus reus are ignored,
prosecutors are not being faithful to these ethical norms.
Let us say more about the conduct of prosecutors, especially
federal prosecutors. If any doubt remains about the serious
problem of prosecutorial abuse, one should consider the
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette series published in late 1998 that
Roberts and Stratton discuss in their book. 69 The newspaper
documented hundreds of cases around the country of willful,
purposeful, and intentional frame-ups of both innocent people
and past criminals against whom evidence was lacking. It
reported on cases in which the FBI lost control of informants and
for decades protected hardened criminal operatives. It exposed
"hundreds of cases" in which federal prosecutors knowingly
framed innocent people with false testimony that they had
purchased from prison inmates-who are not known to be the
most honest people around. Sometimes, it discovered that
prosecutors and federal agents actually fed the information to
inmates themselves. In a practice called "jumping on the bus,"
prosecutors then coached the inmate to concoct a story that
connects some person with the crime that that person really
knows nothing about. The "informing" inmate gets a reduced
sentence for his work, and the prosecutor gets credit for a
successful prosecution.7 0 Further, the Post-Gazette confirmed
what careful observers of the criminal justice system have long
66 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-5 (1980).
67 Id. EC 7-13.
68 Id.
69 See generally ROBERTS & STRATTON, supra note 59, at 150-60.
70 See id. at 151-53.
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known: Prosecutors have almost total control over grand juries,
an institution that in theory is supposed to protect the innocent
from false charges. Among other things, they can easily
manipulate evidence presented to the grand jury-this has been
somewhat aided by a 1992 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that
prosecutors could withhold exculpatory evidence from grand
juries.71
Roberts and Stratton present comments from people on the
inside that give a damning picture of the federal criminal justice
system. One assistant U.S. attorney admitted outright that he
was not interested in innocence or guilt, but just wanted a high-
profile indictment to further his career. Former long-time federal
prosecutor, Thomas Dillard, said that for federal prosecutors
today, "the ends justify the means." Former Deputy U.S.
Attorney General, Arnold I. Burns, said, "The federal grand jury
is no longer a protector of the person who is suspected of a
crime." Former federal prosecutor, and now prominent defense
attorney, Plato Cacheris, said, "[T]here are unfortunately enough
examples of dishonesty cropping up that it is troubling to
anybody in this business." Robert Merkle, a U.S. attorney from
the Reagan era, stated that political pressures today cause
prosecutors "to prosecute absolutely bogus cases to get those
[conviction] statistics" so they can justify their budgets.72
Such abuse goes on because federal prosecutors by and large
are not held accountable either by their superiors or by the
courts. It is also almost impossible for a falsely prosecuted
person to sue them.73 Roberts and Stratton quote Congressman
Joseph McDade, a co-sponsor of the Citizens Protection Act that
seeks to address prosecutorial abuse, as saying that among
federal prosecutors, "[a] win-at-all-costs attitude blinds them into
suppressing exculpatory evidence, falsifying evidence, misleading
grand juries, and other misconduct which most of the time goes
unpunished."74
The latter resembles the situation of operatives of the child
protective system. Despite the fact of massive over-reporting of
child abuse and neglect against parents-apparently upwards of
71 See id. at 158. The case referred to by Roberts and Stratton is United States v.
Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 36 (1992).
72 ROBERTS & STRATTON, supra note 59, at 151, 157-59.
73 See id. at 153, 157-58.
74 Id. at 137.
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two-thirds of the reports are without foundation-with families
often wrongly subjected to ongoing monitoring by agencies and
children removed without grounds, child protective system
personnel are essentially immune from either prosecution or civil
liability for such actions-no matter how negligent or
unwarranted.75
About the criminal justice system's increasing obliviousness
to guilt or innocence, Crier reminds us of (1) the success of law
school "innocence projects" in finding many cases of persons
wrongfully convicted of crimes, (2) former Illinois Governor
George Ryan's moratorium on executions after it came to light
that too many death row inmates in the state were innocent, and
(3) the push in Congress for innocence protective legislation.7 6
Another aspect of prosecutorial misconduct has involved the
increasing tendency of, especially by federal prosecutors, to put
pressure -on lawyers and law firms as a way of getting their
clients, mostly in white collar crime cases, to accept a plea
bargain. In addition to jeopardizing ethical provisions
concerning the promotion of justice, this seems to fly in the face
of Canon 7, which states that a lawyer has an ethical obligation
to "represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law."77
Consider the following well-known cases. Roberts and Stratton
tell us about the U.S. Justice Department's action in 1990
against the Wall Street law firm of Kaye Scholer in the Charles
Keating case discussed above. Recall that Keating's state
conviction was ultimately overturned. The federal government,
in addition to the State of California, prosecuted Keating, and
used the tactic of pressuring Kaye Scholer, which represented
him, to make what it believed would be adverse revelations about
his actions by filing a massive civil lawsuit against it and
freezing its assets. The tactic motivated the firm, which was now
75 See Stephen M. Krason, A Grave Threat to the Family: American Law and
Public Policy on Child Abuse and Neglect, in DEFENDING THE FAMILY: A
SOURCEBOOK 235, 235-36, 251-52 (Paul C. Vitz & Stephen M. Krason eds., 1998)
[hereinafter Krason, A Grave Threat]. The two-thirds figure-based on studies and
government statistics-and the immunity question was also mentioned by a number
of leading writers on the subject of false child, abuse allegations whose work we
surveyed in a recent paper. See generally Stephen M. Krason, The Critics of the
Child Abuse Laws and the Child Protective System: A Survey of the Leading
Literature, 12 CATH. Soc. ScI. REV. 307 (2007).
76 See CRIER, supra note 14, at 117-18.
77 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1980).
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unable to meet its payroll, to settle with the government, and
thereby compromise its legal duty to maintain lawyer-client
privilege. Later, the New York State courts exonerated the one
Kaye Scholer partner whose actions supposedly prompted the
government to go after the firm. The New York City Bar
Association also condemned the government's action in the
case.78
Another outrageous example is the case of Carl Cleveland, a
deacon in the New Orleans Catholic Archdiocese, whose daughter
is a Franciscan University of Steubenville alumnus-the
University where the author teaches, which is known for its
strong Catholic character. Federal prosecutors in Louisiana
outrightly pressured him to suborn perjury; to lie about public
officials who he had represented or his clients had dealt with so
as to further their investigation into alleged corruption in the
state's video poker operations. They were so intent in getting
convictions that they refused to accept Cleveland's offer to waive
immunity and even to get his clients to waive attorney-client
privilege and tell the grand jury everything he knew-which was
nothing incriminating about his clients or anyone else. They
prosecuted him and, in spite of presenting an ineffectual case and
no evidence, secured a conviction. His law practice was
dissolved, most of his assets seized, and he spent more than two
years in prison-until his conviction was reversed unanimously
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the quickest decision in its history.
Still, the prosecutors promised to keep hounding him unless he
would drop his remaining separate appeal of two minor tax
conspiracy convictions even though IRS audits showed that he
was innocent of any criminal activity. 79 It hardly has to be said
78 See ROBERTS & STRATTON, supra note 59, at 107-10. Keating's federal
conviction for fraud, racketeering, and conspiracy was also overturned on appeal
because the U.S. appellate court believed that the jurors in that case might have
been unduly influenced by the state case. Keating ultimately entered into a plea
agreement with federal prosecutors for bankruptcy fraud and sidestepped a pending
second federal trial. See Susan P. Konia, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's
Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1266 n.104 (2003). It was probably
a plea agreement not based on the fact of any actual criminal activity, which this
Article argues is a frequent practice today. Keating continued to publicly deny any
criminal wrongdoing.
79 See generally Carl Cleveland, My Thorn in the Flesh, in AMAZING GRACE FOR
THOSE WHO SUFFER 31, 31-59 (Jeff Cavins & Matthew Pinto eds., 2002). After
discussing the matter with his family, Cleveland decided to plead guilty to the tax
convictions-even though he knew he was not guilty-in order to get the
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that the conduct of the federal prosecutors in this case-and
apparently in the whole video poker dragnet in Louisiana-went
against most of the provisions of the ABA Code that we have
cited. It also blatantly went against Disciplinary Rule 7-103,
which says that "[a] public prosecutor or other government
lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal
charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not
supported by probable cause,"80 and Ethical Consideration 7-26,
which "prohibit[s] the use of fraudulent, false, or perjured
testimony... ,"81 As we said above, federal prosecutors are
seldom held accountable for their actions; they were not held
accountable here, either.
In the Oliver North Iran-Contra case, which is also discussed
by Roberts and Stratton, special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh-
who later received strong criticism for his actions overall in the
Iran-Contra investigation-subpoenaed North's attorney,
Brendan Sullivan, before a federal grand jury to, essentially,
pressure him to testify against his client. Walsh backed off only
after Sullivan appeared with pamphlet copies of the Constitution
to distribute to the jurors and then refused to testify in light of
attorney-client privilege. The North case was not an aberration.
Roberts and Stratton point out that since 1980-it is interesting
that this started with the "conservative," anti-government
Reagan Administration-the practice of subpoenaing lawyers to
testify against their clients has increased. It was rarely done,
and such subpoenas routinely held to be unenforceable, before
that. 82
Was the Brandon Mayfield case another example of the
government targeting lawyers? The Mayfield case involved the
Muslim convert in Oregon who the FBI accused of complicity
with the 2004 train bombings in Madrid on the basis of
uncorroborated fingerprint evidence. In his book, Constitutional
Chaos, Andrew P. Napolitano, Fox News legal analyst and a
former judge and law professor, suggests that the FBI may have
targeted Mayfield because he had defended one of the Portland
Seven terrorist cell defendants in a child custody matter prior to
the latter investigation. Their arrest warrant affidavit stressed
government to agree not to further prosecute him.
80 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103 (1980).
81 Id. EC 7-26.
82 See ROBERTS & STRATTON, supra note 59, at 110-11.
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his role in their defense, his Islamic faith, and his marriage to an
Egyptian.8 3
Overall, it is not surprising that already by the early 1990s-
before most of the sources cited in this Article had appeared-
University of Colorado law professor, Kevin Reitz, wrote in a law
review article that "[u]nder current law, it could be a serious
mistake for a suspect in a criminal case to obtain counsel"
because "[o]btaining a lawyer ... is a bit like inviting a
government agent into the defense camp."8 4
VII. PLEA BARGAINING
Tied in with prosecutorial injustices is the matter of plea
bargaining. According to U.S. Department of Justice statistics,
ninety to ninety-five percent of all federal, state, and local
criminal cases are settled by plea bargaining.8 5 Plea bargaining
became common because of the crowded court dockets that
resulted from the high crime rate in the United States. It was a
way to supposedly meet the Sixth Amendment's requirements for
a "trial"-not a trial as we understand it, but a legal proceeding
before a judge that meets due process requirements-while
taking account of the criminal justice system's limited resources.
Roberts and Stratton relate a number of problems with plea
bargaining that arguably compromise justice. First, truth
readily gets shoved aside. The actual facts of the crime-if for
sure there was one-tend to be downplayed or ignored. They
argue that this has "corrupt[ed] the prosecutorial function by
severing it from the discovery of truth."8 6 This downplaying of
the truth, they insist, has "create[d] a culture" that eventually
has enabled prosecutors to bring charges in the absence of
crimes.87 In their book, they recount a number of such cases-
the best known of which was the case of the "junk bond king,"
Michael Milkin.88 Thirdly, "[p]lea bargaining puts a defendant at
the mercy of his lawyer's negotiating skills instead of the
83 See ANDREW P. NAPOLITANO, CONSTITUTIONAL CHAOS: WHAT HAPPENS
WHEN THE GOVERNMENT BREAKS ITS OWN LAWS 138-39 (2004).
84 Kevin R. Reitz, Clients, Lawyers and the Fifth Amendment: The Need for a
Projected Privilege, 41 DUKE L.J. 572, 573, 659 (1991).
85 See ROBERTS & STRATTON, supra note 59, at 85.
86 Id. at 87.
87 See id. at 87.
88 See id. at 94-99 (discussing the case of Michael Milkin).
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judgment of a jury."8 9 Fourth, since it is known that neither side
wants a trial, it creates a situation in which the leverage a
defense attorney might have had to aid his client-i.e., the
prosecution knowing that it has to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt and withstand the assault of the defense in a
courtroom-is dissipated. 90 Fifth, plea bargaining has allowed
prosecutors to build cases on speculation rather than evidence. 91
This is especially true for white collar crimes, which are often
vaguely defined and not clearly understood, where the
defendants-who are generally not anything like career
criminals-are especially open to plea bargains because they
want just to "putf it all behind them.''92 Rudy Giuliani, a master
at getting plea bargains in his days as a U.S. Attorney in New
York City, commented that white collar defendants are different
from the more typical type because they "roll a lot easier."93
Finally, Roberts and Stratton contend that plea bargaining has
simply opened the door to psychological pressure tactics by
prosecutors. 94  They state well how the practice of plea
bargaining over time metamorphosed from something that
seemed likely to ensure that justice would more easily be done to
something that has led to prosecutions of innocent persons:
When the option of plea bargaining first surfaces, it is
considered by everyone involved as a way of meting out
punishment in a timely way. But with the passage of time,
several things happen. As plea bargaining takes over from jury
trials, little police work is tested in a courtroom before judge
and jury. Prosecutors lose touch with the quality of the police
investigative work that is the basis of indictments, and the
police learn that their work has no more chance of a courtroom
test than one in ten or one in twenty. Gradually the incentive
to find a suspect becomes more compelling than the incentive to
find the guilty person. 95
The problem is heightened by the above comments about the
increasing imperviousness to guilt or innocence among federal
prosecutors-and Roberts and Stratton indicate that it is not
89 See id. at 87.
90 See id. at 87-88.
91 See id. at 90.
92 See id. at 93.
93 See id.
94 See id. at 92-93.
95 Id. at 89.
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much different in state criminal justice systems. Prosecutors
come to see that securing convictions instead of "serving justice"
is how they are judged by the public and by government officials,
and plea bargains constitute convictions. 96
Lest one is led to think that criticism of plea bargaining is
unique to Roberts and Stratton, he should consider the views of a
number of other authorities. Columbia University law professor
H. Richard Uviller, one of the leading authorities on criminal
procedure, says that, "More innocent people are in prison on their
own guilty pleas, I suspect, than by false verdicts of conviction."97
In a program focusing on plea bargaining on PBS's Frontline,
such legal authorities as Albert Alschuler of the University of
Chicago Law School, Stephen Bright of Yale and Harvard law
schools, and Stephen Schulhofer of New York University Law
School were sharply critical. They and a number of other
authorities, even if sympathetic, confirmed many of the problems
and injustices in the system that Roberts and Stratton identify.98
These problems with plea bargaining raise the same
questions of conflict with Ethical Considerations 8-2 (whether
rules of law are "just"), 8-5 ("fraudulent, deceptive" conduct), and
7-13 (regarding prosecutorial conduct) as above. In light of the
criticism that plea bargaining results in the truly guilty getting
off easier, that it creates skepticism about the criminal justice
system, and whether considerations of justice actually prevail,
plea bargaining raises further questions in light of EC 8-2: The
law is "deficient" if it is not "responsive to the needs of society."99
The point that it relies upon the strength of a lawyer's
negotiating skills-which is not the essence of what the
lawyering activity is supposed to be about-makes one wonder if
it does not also offend EC 8-3, which is not mentioned above:
"The fair administration of justice requires the availability of
competent lawyers."'100 This also pertains to Canon 6, which
states that "a lawyer should act with competence and proper care
in representing clients."'1 1 While it is true that dispensing with
96 See id.
97 H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED PROSECUTION OF
CRIME IN AMERICA 192 (1996).
98 See Frontline: The Plea (PBS television broadcast June 17, 2004), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea/interviews/.
99 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-2 (1980).
100 Id. EC 8-3.
101 Id. EC 6-1.
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plea bargaining would require the injection of much more in the
way of resources into the legal system, our earlier legal history
certainly indicates that such a regime is not necessary. Still, the
massive increase of criminal cases that brought about plea
bargaining shows what happens when traditional moral
restraints and cultural norms and patterns of life are altered,
loosened, or break down.
VIII. FORFEITURE LAWS
Another area where we have seen the rise not only of
prosecutorial, but also police department, misconduct has been
asset forfeiture. As another tool in the federal government's war
on drugs-which has stimulated some of the abuses discussed in
this Article-Congress passed the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act
of 1984, which provided that a full range of personal and real
property "used, or intended to be used" in the violation of federal
drug laws could be seized by the government. The government's
powers under the Act were expanded by revisions in 1986, 1990,
and 1992, and permit forfeiture for many more criminal offenses
than just those involving drugs. State and local governments
have followed suit with their own forfeiture statutes-at least
one state permits forfeiture for merely alleged criminal activity.
As the 1990s rolled around, the U.S. Justice Department was
ordering U.S. attorneys around the country to work to "increase
forfeiture income." The main beneficiaries of forfeiture statutes
have been law enforcement agencies and prosecutorial arms,
which typically are the designated recipients of the property,
although sometimes it also falls into the hands of individuals
within those entities.10 2
As Roberts and Stratton wrote, the 1984 Act has produced
many "horror stories," as its wording was so loose and unclear-
recall the dangers of vague laws discussed above-that it allowed
an owner's property to be seized if, without his knowledge or
even against his will, it is used to facilitate the commission of one
of the crimes in question. 10 3 For example, a retired Army officer
in California lost his rental property because one of his tenants
was apparently a drug dealer. An elderly woman in Washington,
D.C. lost the motel she owned because a prostitute made use of a
102 ROBERTS & STRATTON, supra note 59, at 124-26, 135.
103 See id. at 125.
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room in it, and another woman lost her house because a
grandchild once had drugs in it. A man in New Jersey lost his
car because he once picked up a hitchhiker who, without his
knowledge, had drugs in his possession. Federal authorities
seized a Texas motel because motel employees reported possible
drug-dealing activity by some of the guests. The U.S. Attorney
believed that the motel had tacitly approved the activity because
it did not charge enough for its rooms!104 The list of horror
stories could go on and on. The point is that, as Roberts and
Stratton put it, "your home and everyone else's can be confiscated
simply by an undercover agent arranging for a drug transaction
to take place on your front lawn or in your driveway." 10 5 So we
can see that the Kelo case was not the first recent outrageous
example-nor the first upheld by the courts-of the flagrant
violation of citizen property rights.
All that the 1984 Act requires for a property seizure-which,
recall, is a civil action-is not a conviction of someone of a crime,
but mere probable cause. This has resulted in instances of such
flagrant abuse as police setting up routine roadblocks to
supposedly stop drug traffickers where they regard motorists
carrying cash beyond a certain amount as probable cause of drug
activity-and promptly seize it. In the early 1990s, the Orlando
Sentinel videotaped highway stops in Florida and concluded that
police were using numerous pretexts to get motorists' cash.10 6
The abuses have been so great that Congressman Henry Hyde
conducted hearings when he was Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives. In these
hearings, former New York City Police Commissioner Patrick
Murphy said that the laws tempted police departments to try to
get assets for their own benefit, instead of to stop criminal
activity. 1°7 Is this like the red light cameras in Washington,
D.C., where the rationale was traffic safety, but the mayor finally
admitted that money was the motivation?'08 It is often difficult
for innocent citizens to get their property back and, sometimes
when they try, they are threatened with indictment as co-
104 See id. at 4, 127-28.
105 Id. at 128.
106 See id. at 129-30.
107 See id. at 129.
108 Tarron Lively, Traffic Cameras Reaping Millions; Violations Way Down, City
Says, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at Al.
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conspirators in the criminal activity. 109 So far no major reform of
the federal statute has occurred. The book, License to Steal, by
the eminent constitutional scholar Leonard W. Levy, is the best
single source about the forfeiture question, from the history of
the notion in English and American law, to the recent statutory
developments, and to the gross abuses by government that we
have been discussing. 110
Clearly, these abuses in the forfeiture laws are "deficiencies
in the legal system" that lawyers should "initiate corrective
measures" about. They seem to be "a rule of law ... [that] causes
or contributes to an unjust result." It is likely that such practices
are not helping the legal system to "function in a manner that
commands public respect," so lawyers should try to change
them-or better yet, should have perhaps scrutinized them more
closely when they were first proposed."
IX. OTHER TROUBLESOME DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
There have been other troublesome developments in the
criminal law. Statutes of limitation have been eliminated in
many jurisdictions in criminal child abuse cases and even in
regard to the filing of civil suits in these kinds of cases. We have
seen this in the priest sex abuse scandal of the last few years in
the Catholic Church in the United States. Most of the alleged
abuse occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, and it is not altogether
clear that all of the claims are true. Moreover, some of the claims
of abuse in these cases come forth after so-called "recovered
memory" therapy, which has increasingly been discredited. 1 2
Also in the child abuse area, we have witnessed the
elimination from the law of the traditional common law
assumption-seen also in Catholic teaching about culpability for
sin-that a child below age seven is not reliable enough to testify
in court. The result too often has been a manipulation of
children by therapists, counselors, and prosecutorial authorities
to secure convictions against innocent alleged perpetrators,
109 See ROBERTS & STRATTON, supra note 59, at 130.
110 See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF
PROPERTY (1996).
111 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-1, 8-2 (1980).
112 See, e.g., ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF
REPRESSED MEMORY: FALSE MEMORIES AND ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 32
(1994).
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sometimes their parents. Some of these cases have featured
downright fanciful and outrageous claims by children that,
unfortunately for the cause of justice, have been taken seriously
by prosecutors and courts.113
In other ways, legal changes have given the State an
increasingly controlling and threatening role in the most
intimate of human associations, marriage and the family. Those
who cried shrilly about proscribing pornography and abortion-
"the state should not be in the bedroom"-were among the
strongest promoters of marital rape laws that became
widespread after the 1970s, despite their difficulty of
enforcement and obvious intrusiveness and opportunities for
abuse. Have these people opposed the numerous local ordinances
around the country that limit the number of people who can sleep
in the same bedroom in a dwelling? Domestic violence statutes
are another type of law that invites expansive and unreasonable
application, like that of the young boy in Ohio who was charged
for kicking his mother under the table in a restaurant. Another
related example is the trend in some states to hold parents
criminally liable for the actions of their children, which of course
is fully consistent with the movement to eliminate fault as the
basis for successfully prosecuting people.
These kinds of laws have an obvious utilitarian bent-
seeking to solve difficult problems regardless of the means-that
most fundamentally threatens the notion of the rule of law,
grounded as it is on the maintenance of principle regardless of
the circumstances and irrespective of whether one is innocent or
guilty. Many of these laws have been motivated by ideological
objectives as promoted by organized interests. The very
commitment to the rule of law means that sound legal principles
must be preserved in spite of ideological or pragmatic pressures.
So why did lawyers allow such changes to be made in light of the
Canon 8 obligations of which we have spoken?
X. MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
Ethical Consideration 8-1, again, talks of the need to make
"constant efforts to maintain and improve our legal system," and
EC 8-2 calls on lawyers to seek to repeal or amend "outmoded"
113 See, e.g., Krason, A Grave Threat, supra note 75, at 240-45.
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laws. 114 Our criminal law does not seem to have kept up with a
changed and clearer understanding of mental illness. By and
large, it still subscribes to the old M'Naughten rule from the
English common law, i.e., that a person is legally insane if at the
time of committing the criminal act, he did not know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing or, if he did know it, he did
not know what he was doing was wrong. Insane or not, however,
anyone who has worked with or been around people with various
mental illnesses knows that many of them do not fully have the
capability to control their actions, and that often they can be set
off on a destructive course for reasons we cannot even fathom or
in situations we do not expect. It is not surprising that Crier
confirms what many of us independently know: "Our prisons are
now brimming with the mentally ill."115 She contends, perhaps in
light of high-profile cases like that of John Hinckley and the
general public revulsion at consistent high amounts of crime,
that we keep the M'Naughten rule because it is politically
popular. 116  Just because some defense lawyers try to
unreasonably stretch the insanity defense to get their clients off
does not mean that some really are not mentally ill and that this
caused them or helped cause them to commit a crime.
Crier cites a number of examples that are worth pondering.
One was the case of Andrea Yates. She was the Houston woman,
apparently an evangelical Christian, who drowned her five
children as the result of post-partum depression. Even the
State's psychiatrist testified that she was psychotic and possibly
schizophrenic, and that just before the crime, doctors had taken
her off her medications. Since the M'Naughten rule was
operational, she was convicted-although not given the death
penalty.1 17 Another was the case of Daniel Colwell in Georgia.
He had been diagnosed as schizophrenic and manic-depressive,
had warned his sister to tell the police that he wanted to kill
someone, and kept telling his doctors and the police to kill him.
He finally went out and fatally shot two people so that the
114 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-1, 8-2.
115 Crier, supra note 14, at 113.
116 See id. at 112-13.
117 See id. at 112. In a retrial in the summer of 2006, Yates was acquitted for
reasons of insanity and was sent to a state mental institution. See Brian Doherty,
"You Can't See Why on an fMRI": What Science Can, and Can't, Tell Us About the
Insanity Defense, REASON, July 2007, at 34, 34, available at http://www.reason.com/
news/show/120266.html.
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authorities would in turn execute him. He was convicted and, on
appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court acknowledged that while he
was "likely" mentally ill, he was still sane under the M'Naughten
rule. 118 Another case she cites is that of Ricky Ray Rector, who
was convicted of murder and had suffered brain damage from a
self-inflicted gunshot wound years before. "Accustomed to saving
his dessert until bedtime, he carefully set it aside after his last
meal" before being escorted to the gas chamber. On that walk, he
stated that he would be voting in the fall election. 119 He clearly
did not even realize that he was about to be executed.
XI. WHY THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE OCCURRED
It is submitted that a number of reasons-involving deeper
trends in and changing viewpoints about the law, influences from
within the legal profession, and social and political
considerations-are responsible for the developments discussed.
First, as alluded to above, the explosion of crime in recent
decades has been a significant factor. People look for an
expeditious way to deal with it. This certainly helps to explain
the overwhelming reliance on plea bargaining. Second, as
identified by Luna, there has been a "slow but certain movement
away from common law principles of crime and punishment and
toward a larger ambit for the criminal justice system."'120 Instead
of determining guilt or innocence according to a fault-based
framework, the criminal justice system has increasingly reduced
its objective to social control. This helps explain, for example, the
decline in the importance of mens rea. Luna says that this trend
has been "exacerbated by the slow disappearance of the line
between crime and tort, with conduct that was once actionable
only by civil suit now susceptible to criminal prosecution as well,
oftentimes at the sole discretion of the relevant law enforcement
agency."'121 We could see this, for example, in the discussion
about white collar crime prosecutions solely on the basis of
theories of the prosecutors. Third, Luna speaks about the
continued force of legal moralism, which has changed its focus
from earlier in our history regarding the kinds of moral
standards that it tries to impose by law, i.e., if it was prohibition
118 See id. at 113.
119 See id. at 117.
120 Luna, supra note 51, at 4.
121 Id.
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of alcohol at an earlier time, it is, say, environmentalism today.
While certainly there is no problem in principle with the law
imposing and enforcing moral perspectives-indeed, when we
consider that much of the traditional criminal law that forbade
murder, theft, rape, etc. punished primarily grave moral
transgressions, we can see that that is inevitable-the particular
moralistic positions that our law increasingly embraces today
have a secular root. They are thus subject to the shifting sands
of a probably untutored public opinion, instead of being based,
like our law traditionally was, on time-tested principles,
generally with a sound philosophical, to say nothing of religious,
foundation. Fourth, Luna mentions the influence of what he
calls "the one-way ratchet of law-and-order politics" that gives
legislators "every reason to add new crimes and punishments,
which make great campaign fodder." There is, however, "no
countervailing political interest in cutting the penal code. ' 122 A
lot of interest groups-in an era when politicians are so occupied
in satisfying them-want new criminal law provisions to achieve
their objectives, and they often encounter no organized
resistance. For example, virtually no one opposed the coalition of
academics, feminist theorists, activists from the medical
community, children's rights advocates, and child welfare
lawyers who helped fashion CAPTA in the 1970s. 123 After all,
who would be against fighting child abuse, since most did not see
the implications that the approach embodied in CAPTA would
have for the family? How many opposed the early environmental
groups in the 1970s who influenced the basics of U.S.
environmental law? After all, who supported pollution? Today,
the animal welfare advocates have had an almost clear field in
influencing state legislatures to fashion increasingly intrusive-
and unwarranted-animal cruelty laws. Fifth, Luna tells us that
law enforcement officials contribute to over-criminalization.
Once we go down the path of over-criminalization, police and
prosecutors can exert more authority in the criminal justice
system. They push for new criminal law provisions dealing
essentially with the same conduct. This makes it easier for them
to get convictions and to put people away for a longer time. 2 4
122 Id. at 5.
123 See Philip Jenkins, Believe the Children?: Child Abuse and the American
Legal System, CHRONICLES, Jan. 1993, at 20, 21-22.
124 See Luna, supra note 51, at 5-6.
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Finally, DeLong tells us that elected officials, courts, and the
legal profession all have contributed significantly to over-
criminalization and the erosion of legal and constitutional
protections. Presidents, members of Congress, state governors,
and state legislators-many of whom are lawyers-during the
past quarter century have had "the habit of loading criminal
provisions and other sanctions into every law." It "has become a
thoughtless reflex." Further, he says that at the federal level-
we would argue that the same thing generally happens at the
state level-these elected officials, despite occasional noise-
making and posturing, have not made "any serious effort to rein
in regulators who use vague statutes backed up by hair-raising
penalties to stretch their authority to the utmost."125 In fact,
legislators keep passing vague statutes and executives keep
signing the legislation. Most judges have not paid attention to
the erosion of liberties. As stated above, there was a time when
the general good faith of prosecutors-and, DeLong says,
regulators as well-could be assumed. In a certain sense,
deference to them was understandable-although still not
acceptable, as Madison's warning in his Memorial and
Remonstrance about the dangers of any break in religious liberty
suggests-but conditions, as shown above, have long since
changed. DeLong insists that judges still have not caught on to
what is really happening. 126
DeLong argues that the legal profession overall is "a primary
villain." He says it has developed a certain mentality that has
spawned these conditions: "Its 'there oughta be a law' mindset
has encouraged government to react to every perceived problem
with a new penalty, and to respond to each failure of this
approach by making the penalty more severe and redoubling
enforcement efforts." 127  We can also readily fault the legal
profession for failing to accommodate different groups of people
in society, ignoring the common good, and "absolutizing"
rights. 128 The legal profession has encouraged all of this by its
tendency to view things in a one-dimensional fashion, with
everything essentially coming down to a question of rights. This
125 DeLong, supra note 10, at 38.
126 See id. at 38-39.
127 Id. at 38.
128 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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does not help the cause of furthering the common good-or even
necessarily of achieving just results.
DeLong quotes the eminent constitutional scholar Paul
Bator who in 1990 criticized both the courts and the legal
profession for failing "in their essential professional tasks of
stabilizing, clarifying, and improving the national law, so as to
make it useful for its 'consumers,'" and for their lack of "a sense
of decent obligation" to both those who must apply the law and
those who are expected to obey it.129 That, of course, takes us
right back to Canon 8.
The latter view of law helps to explain why the legal
profession has allowed the developments discussed to occur.
Still, the prosecutorial and other official abuse mentioned above
readily makes one recoil in disgust, and it is hard to understand
how lawyers have not raised a public cry against it-more so in
light of their obligations under Canon 8 and the other provisions
mentioned that very directly repudiate some such behaviors. To
be sure, some lawyers have strongly objected, such as Stratton,
Napolitano, Crier, and Howard. They stand, it seems, as
exceptions. Despite the notoriety of their authors, though, not all
of their books were bought by mainstream publishers. One
reason for the seeming obliviousness of lawyers, I would suggest,
is that they are simply too absorbed in their own practices. A
study by the ABA's Commission on Billable Hours traced the
growth of time spent on the job over the last forty years. In 1965,
it was 1,200-1,600 billable hours per year. In 1980, it was
1,600-1,800. By 2000, for associates in big firms, especially if
they wanted to establish themselves, it was 2,000-2,400-not
including other essential components to building a successful law
practice such as administrative and management duties,
recruiting and mentoring, pro bono work, continuing legal
education (mandatory in most states), client development, and
community and bar activities. To compile that many billable
hours, approximately forty hours per week, a lawyer has to work
twelve hours per day. 130  Indeed, U.S. Labor Department
statistics reveal that thirty-seven percent of all lawyers in the
country work 50 hours or more per week. 13' As U.S. Supreme
129 DeLong, supra note 10, at 38.
130 Seltzer Fontaine Beckwith, Legal Search Consultants, Time Is Money, http:/
www.sfbsearch.com/content.cfmID/20061 (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
131 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL
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Court Justice Stephen Breyer has said, the billable hour system
has in "many ways ... diminished" the practice of law. He goes
on, "I can't think of a more important problem facing the
profession ... than how to maintain a life for a young lawyer that
will lead to satisfaction in his or her career, that will produce
time for a family, and will produce time for some form of
community and public service.. ,,132 The latter, of course,
would include attention to what the law needs for improvement.
Still, even if lawyers had more time to focus on public
concerns, that does not necessarily mean they would turn their
attention to trying to root out the problems discussed above.
That is because, we would submit, the focus on public interest
within the legal profession in recent decades has perhaps been
too narrow. It seems like it comes down primarily to providing
legal services, probably pro bono, for those who cannot afford
them or otherwise obtain them. As noted above, pro bono work is
almost factored in as something the budding successful lawyer
needs to do. This is surely a laudable goal, but it is too limited.
Lawyers should also be concerned with the entire legal system,
which is what Canon 8 points to. In some ways, this limited view
is not surprising, since their legal education often gives very
little, if any, attention to jurisprudence-the "why" and "what
should be" of the law-which is the very concern of Canon 8.
Where has the organized bar been in the midst of these
developments? The ABA, in spite of Canon 8, perhaps also has
been paying insufficient attention. While the ABA has been
concerned about federal legislation-at least in specific matters-
that seems to erode attorney-client privilege, the upholding of
due process in such areas as anti-terrorist legislation, and ready
access to the legal system regardless of income, it has not been
able to bring itself to criticize the evident diminution of due
process that takes place in plea bargaining. While its Criminal
Justice Section's magazine features articles lamenting about how
plea bargaining "discourages vigorous advocacy" and pointing to
it as a cause of wrongful convictions, the ABA has not called for
its elimination or even for sweeping reform of the system.133
OUTLOOK HANDBOOK: LAWYERS 2 (2008-2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/
oco/ocos053.pdf.
132 Robert Pack, The Tyranny of the Billable Hour, WASH. LAW., Jan. 2005, at
19, 22 (emphasis added).
133 See, e.g., Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Inadequate Representation
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Moreover, on its web site one does not observe the searching
examination of the abundant abuses that appear in, say, the
Roberts and Stratton book, even though they go to the very core
of the legal system. The ABA has actually tended to oppose legal
changes that address some of the problems discussed in this
Article, such as regulatory reform, medical malpractice reform
and general tort reform, changes to affirmative action, and even
racial quota systems. The latter two areas concern the lack of
accommodation in present American law that Howard speaks of
and the "lawsuit culture" that both he and Crier discuss. The
ABA has also spent a substantial amount of time on public
pronouncements in public policy areas that at best have a
tangential relationship to improving the law. For example, the
ABA's public policy positions in recent years have concerned such
matters as immigration policy, tax questions, funding for the
National Endowment for the Arts, health care programs, use of
the revenue generated by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
federal student loan forgiveness, the Endangered Species Act,
welfare reform, federal regulation of child care facilities, sex
education in the schools, U.S. payment of UN dues, campaign
finance reform, and gun control. Even its support for the
International Criminal Court cannot be said to be exclusively, or
perhaps even primarily, a legal question with the heavy foreign
policy considerations involved. The ABA has sometimes been
accused of promoting an ideological agenda. 134 At the very least,
one can legitimately wonder if, with its attention to "large" public
policy questions, it is not missing the very spirit of what its
Canon 8 embodies.
The other reasons why the legal profession has allowed these
trends to take hold go deeper, to the attitudes and behavior of
lawyers and the thinking about law that has sweepingly taken
hold of our legal system.
Concerning lawyers' attitudes and behavior, we turn again to
Judge Edith Jones of the Fifth Circuit. She says:
and Wrongful Conviction, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2003, at 57, 57.
134 See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE'S REPUBLICAN POLICY COMM., HOW
THE ABA BECAME A LEFT-WING LOBBYING GROUP (1997), http:/
www.prodeathpenalty.com/ABA.htm; The ABA, the War on Terrorism, and Civil
Liberties, ABA WATCH (Federalist Soc'y, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/id.78/default.asp; Young Lawyers Division
Assembly, BAR WATCH BULL. (Federalist Soc'y, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 10, 2007, available
at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/pubID.45/pub-detail.asp.
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Because law has become a self-avowed business, pressure
mounts to give clients the advice they want to hear, to pander to
the clients' goal through deft manipulation of the law.... The
legal system has also been wounded by lawyers who themselves
no longer respect the rule of law .... [Some] seem uninhibited
about making misstatements to the court or their opponents or
destroying or falsifying evidence. 135
While Judge Jones may have been speaking primarily about
private practice lawyers, what we have said certainly shows that
it applies to public prosecutors as well. Indeed, plea bargaining
routinely involves false statements in court, e.g., the judge will
ask the defendant to affirm that no deal prompted his guilty plea,
when of course it did and the judge knows it.136
In his book, Napolitano gets right to the crux of the "deeper
problems" confronting the system which, more than anything
else, have gotten it into its current condition. He says that the
problem with our law today is that positivism has gained the
upper hand. Natural law jurisprudence, which acknowledges
that fundamental rights and human freedom come ultimately
from God, who wrote them into our very nature which He is the
Author of, no longer carries much sway in American law. The
positivists believe, first, that all rights and freedom come from
the state and that the state can take them away, so long as the
majority wills it-or at least tolerates it. Second, that the law is
just and valid merely if it is correctly enacted, i.e., the proper
procedures are followed. The positivist is a utilitarian. As
Napolitano puts it, for the "positivist, the government's goal is to
bring about the greatest benefit to the greatest number of
people." 13 7 It is clearly a result-oriented jurisprudence that the
positivist seeks-results that he is sure, in spite of his human
limitations, will be desirable.
Picking up on this, Roberts and Stratton say that we have
seen in the American legal system the diminishing of the
common law tradition, with its legal protections, and the
increasing triumph of the utilitarian "Benthamite" perspective.
Bentham advocated the elimination of many of the basic,
traditional principles of the common law, and it is interesting
and uncanny to note how many of the unfortunate developments
135 Hawkins, supra note 36.
136 See ROBERTS & STRATTON, supra note 59, at 93.
137 Napolitano, supra note 83, at xvii.
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we have chronicled in this Article were advocated by Bentham as
part of his desire to establish a result-oriented jurisprudence
grounded upon the notion of the greatest good for the greatest
number. He believed, for example, that property rights are
merely the legally dispensable creations of government. Today,
we have runaway eminent domain and civil forfeiture and
crunching, unreasonable regulation of private property. He
praised the star chamber where the jury was dispensed with.
Today, we witness prosecutors manipulating grand juries, plea
bargaining that has taken the place of jury trials, and some
commentators who call for the outright elimination of the jury
system. He advocated torture as a way to supposedly get to the
truth. Today prosecutors employ pressure tactics to motivate
pleas, which amount to a kind of psychological torture. 138
Bentham also opposed the attorney-client privilege-we have
seen the recent attempts to undermine that.
What we have witnessed with our increasingly Benthamite-
type jurisprudence of today is the typical consequence of a
utilitarian philosophy: The individual and his rights are
suppressed and the innocent are assailed. As philosopher Daniel
J. Sullivan puts it:
"[T]he greatest good of the greatest number"..., standard fails
to recognize that certain values attaching to the individual
person belong to an order which towers over that of the general
civic welfare. It is wrong, for example, to subject one person to
injustice so that the community as a whole can benefit .... 139
That takes us right back to Robert Bolt's A Man for All
Seasons with which we began. For the sake of getting at the
Devil-a good end, if there ever were one-Will Roper would
have destroyed all of the human laws set up so that tempted
men, or outright corrupt men with power, would be restrained.
That restraint is perhaps ultimately for the sake of the innocent,
even though the guilty derive the benefit of it, too-or maybe it is
for the guilty also because they too are human beings deserving
of civilized treatment regardless of what they may have actually
done. When those laws-that is, those legal protections-are
gone and the Devil--or perhaps wicked men doing his bidding
138 See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 8
(1978) ('The parallels between the modern American plea bargaining system and the
ancient system of judicial torture are many and chilling.").
139 DANIEL J. SULLIVAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 168 (rev. ed. 1964).
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wittingly or not-turn on us, not much is left to protect us. What
we said makes clear that Thomas More, a saint to be sure but
also a wise old lawyer and observer of men, was right. This
development in American law is truly a calamity, but it is even
worse that far too many in the legal profession have paid little
attention while it has happened.
